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A B S T R A C T 
As the US economy continues to recover from an immense collapse in its housing 
market, there is speculation of a comparable situation arising in China with real estate 
prices continuing to skyrocket and creating concerns of a bubble. This paper aims to define 
what a "bubble" is and whether or not a housing bubble exists in China. As the US 
economy and China ' s economy are closely tied, this topic is relevant for determining the 
backlash effect on the U S should China ' s real estate market collapse. 
The existence of a real estate bubble in China has been highly publicized with 
considerable disagreement regarding whether China ' s current state of rising housing prices 
is representative of a bubble. This paper will focus on the definition and identification of a 
bubble and use related research findings to better analyze both sides of this argument in 
detecting the presence of a potential housing bubble in China. By analyzing historical 
accounts of bubbles through comparisons of other economies that have experienced or are 
experiencing growth situations similar to China, I identified the 5 factors most indicative of 
a bubble: rapid economic growth, investment and construction growth, the accessibility of 
credit, income disparity, and the role of population. 
I then compare the situation in China along these five dimensions. Overall, my 
comparisons suggest that the rapid real estate price increases in China are more indicative 
of supply and demand and are not reflective of a bubble. 
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1. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1.1 THE C U R R E N T SITUATION IN CH I N A 
Economic growth in China has more than octupled since its government passed 
massive reforms in the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 1.1). Economic growth is most 
commonly measured by a country 's growth in Gross Domestic Product. Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) consists of four components: consumption, investment, government 
expenditures, and the difference between exports and imports. The G D P factor that has 
grown most significantly for China is the export / import factor. At present, "China-
based factories make 7 0 % of the wor ld ' s toys, 60 percent of its bicycles, half of its 
shoes, and one-third of its luggage" (Shenkar, 2005). A factor contributing to the growth 
in manufacturing is the continued increases in foreign direct investment facilitated by 
China ' s reforms regarding international trade. Multinational corporations have 
continued to invest heavily in China, growing from $40.7 billion in 2000 to $92.4 billion 
in 2008—a growth rate of 127% over the past eight years (see Table 1.1). In addition, 
China has decentralized its government power, allowing local leaders to emerge with 
more responsibility for the growth and prosperity of their province. The localization of 
government in conjunction with decreased restrictions on private business has enabled 
more citizens to pursue entrepreneurial endeavors. This has created additional 
employment and income, bringing 200 million farmers out of poverty from 1983 to 1993 
(Friedmann, 2005). Several rural areas have transformed into urban areas due to 
increased prosperity that has made modernization prevalent across China. Regulations 
restricting citizen migration have also been reduced by the government, enabling more 
citizens to migrate to urban provinces {People's Daily, 2003). The populat ion 's urban-
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to-rural ratio (calculated by measuring citizens living in urban areas divided by citizens 
living in rural areas) is projected to surpass 5 0 % in 2012, indicating that the majority of 
Chinese citizens will be living in cities. The average urban-to-rural ratio had been 
steadily growing since 1949 (see Figure 1.2). Larger populations in cities increase 
overall GDP. In cities, the spending rates on items such as food, energy, and durable 
goods is higher. Therefore the growing number of urban citizens has significantly 
impacted the "consumption" component of GDP. 













Table 1.1: Total Foreign Direct Investment in China 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total FDI 
Number of projects 22,347 26,140 34,171 41,081 43,664 44,001 41,485 37,871 27,514 23,435 
Growth (%) 32.1 17.0 30.7 20.2 6.3 0.8 (5.7) (8.7) (27.3) (14.8) 
Utilized FDI ($ billion) 40.7 46.9 52.7 53.5 60.6 60.3 69.5 74.8 92.4 90.0 
Growth (%) 1.0 15.1 12.5 1.4 13.3 (0.5) 4.5 18.6 23.6 (2.6) 
Source: uschina.org 
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Figure 1.3: China Real Estate Index (Jan 2007 = 100) 
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Source: Ahuja, A., Et. Al.,(2010) 
The "investment" component of China ' s G D P has also been increasing. This 
component of GDP is measured by the amount of investment into hard, durable goods 
such as real estate. Real housing prices across China have increased 2 2 5 % over the last 
decade, and 8 0 0 % since 2003 (Wu, Gyourko, Deng, 2010) (see Figure 1.3). Loan 
issuance rose by 3 8 % from the beginning 2009 to the end of the first quarter of 2010 for 
residential customers and 5 0 % for developers (chinadataonline.org). The price to income 
ratio is a measure commonly used to assess the affordability of housing. This ratio is 
calculated by dividing the retail price of the property by the average annual disposable 
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income of a citizen. In Beijing and other large providences, it was reported to be 27x in 
2007 (Gogerty, 2010), indicating that the average price of property is 27 t imes that of 
the average annual disposable income of a Chinese citizen in these provinces. The 
World Bank considers 5x as affordable. This ratio suggests that owners cannot afford 
their properties and also suggests the possible overvaluation of the real estate in these 
areas. 
2. DEFINING A " B U B B L E " 
2.1 S I M P L E D E F I N I T I O N 
A "bubble" is said to have occurred when property (or other asset) has gained 
rapid value that exceeds its true worth. When an asset rises in value due to factors 
unrelated to its intrinsic or fundamental value, there is a high probability that there will 
be a price deflation or a price correction in the future. This correction, otherwise known 
as the bubble collapse, is frequently jus t as rapid as the growth and thus leaves 
unknowing investors with large losses. 
The criterion for identifying a bubble is difficult. There are factors that must be 
looked at subjectively and this oftentimes causes debate—as is the situation with 
China ' s real estate. In real estate it is easier for bubbles to form than in other assets such 
as stocks. This is because there are no opportunities for investors to short sell real estate 
(i.e. bet against the rising price). Investments where there is an opportunity to short sell 
enables the price of the asset to be more aligned with its fundamental value because both 
optimistic and pessimistic investors are able to participate. Only optimistic investors are 
able to participate in the pricing of real estate, and thus cause its rising value. 
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Fundamental value is also difficult to measure with real estate. Fundamental 
value is the real value of an asset. With stocks, the fundamental value per share is tied to 
a company ' s earnings. However with property the consumer largely determines this 
value. The fundamental value of property is more aligned with the preferences of each 
consumer and the amount they are willing to pay for those preferences. Because these 
preferences vary greatly from person-to-person, fundamental value cannot be easily 
measured or justified. 
2.2 E L E M E N T S O F A B U B B L E 
It is possible that bubbles do not truly reveal themselves until after they have 
collapsed. This section will examine bubble elements in previous real estate situations in 
Ireland and Japan, both now commonly viewed as bubbles. Ireland and Japan are chosen 
to be analyzed because they both exemplify the following factors of a bubble that can be 
applied to China: 
1. Rapid Economic Growth 
2. Investment and Construction Growth 
3. Access to Capital 
4. Income Disparity 
5. The Role of Population 
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2.3 H I S T O R I C L E E X A M P L E # 1 : I R E L A N D 
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Source: Permanent tsb The analy is of the bubble in Ireland illustrates the following common factors of 
a bubble: "rapid economic growth," "investment and construction growth," and "access 
to capital." From 1981 to 1987, Ireland's economy was in a state of recession in which 
property values decreased considerably as unemployment rose to a peak of 17%. The 
recovery period from 1987 to 1994 instilled stability and created small growth but the 
most significant economic growth began in 1995 and continued until 2007. During this 
t ime, Ireland experienced high employment , high incomes, appreciating housing prices, 
and more lending from its banks. 
In general, property rates rise due to the constraint of supply not being able to 
meet demand during the t ime of the boom. High demand causes prices to rise, prompting 
more construction. The construction of commercial as well as residential property is not 
instant, and building in the present t ime to predict future demand can be risky. However , 
for Ireland it could have been viewed as rational for home builders to continue to build 
irrespective of demand signals considering that home prices had been continually 
increasing every year for the past decade (see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 shows the highest number of properties being completed in 2007, 
correlating with the highest prices from Figure 2.2. However , these figures are not 
consistent with the number of home loans (see Figure 2.4) and the number of new house 
registrations (see Figure 2.3). These charts show decline starting in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively. The disparity of dates between purchases (new house registrations and 
home loans) and housing construction indicates the miscalculation of future demand by 
construction companies. The t ime between the start and the completion of construction 
projects makes it difficult for companies to adjust to unanticipated shifts in demand. 
Ireland had excess supply in 2007 that led to a decline in construction and home prices. 
As a result, unemployment increases considerably as construction is a significant source 
of employment (see Figure 2.5).The loss of income from Ireland's biggest industry 
caused loan defaults to increase, further exacerbating the economic collapse. 
Figure 2.2: Ireland Number of Houses Figure 23: Ireland New House 
Completed (Construction) Purchases 
************************ 
Source: CSO (Central Statistics Office of Ireland) Source: CSO (Central Statistics Office of Ireland) 
Figure 2.4: Ireland Home Loans Issued Figure 2.5: Ireland Unemployment Rate 
Source: CSO (Central Statistics Office of Ireland) Source: CSO (Central Statistics Office of Ireland) 
I 
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The bubble in Ireland is not dissimilar to many other real estate bubbles: the 
excessive supply of properties as a result of continual construction of homes . This 
construction is made rationale because of the historical appreciation of property value. 
Ireland's current unemployment rate stands at 13.6%, with recent news in 2010 of the 
Irish government injecting 12 billion Euros into its banking industry (16 billion USD) to 
continue the recovery of its financial sector (Pogatchnik, 2010). According to the most 
recent Irish census in 2006, it was estimated that a total of 15.05% of all properties were 
vacant and it has been estimated for 2009 that the vacancy rate stood at 17 .43% 
(Willams, Hughes, Redmond, 2010). 
2.3 H I S T O R I C A L E X A M P L E #2 : J A P A N 
Figure 2.6: Japan Big City Residential Property Average Price 1980- 2006 
1,000,000 
Year 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: The Statistics Bureau 
The Japanese asset bubble illustrates the following factors of a bubble: "rapid 
economic growth," "access to capital," " income disparity," and "the role of population." 
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The asset bubble in Japan was initiated by the government ' s deregulation of the 
financial system. Before 1985, Japanese banks were not allowed to pay interest to 
depositors. After the deregulation, banks began to compete heavily with each other to 
collect customers ' deposits. This led to a gradual decrease in the interest rate spread (the 
rate of lending subtract the interest rate for deposits) because the banks did not raise 
rates for borrowers. Instead, banks increased profits by issuing more loans. The cash to 
satisfy the increase in lending became available through the additional deposits 
generated by these new regulations (see Figure 2.7) (Wood, 1992). By 1991 Japan had 
lent 116 trillion yen ($1.17 trillion U S D , converted at 98.5 yen per USD) solely to the 
property and construction sectors (Watkins, 1992). Banks also started to issued 
additional shares of their own bank and established a complicated system of selling and 
buying shares from companies in their keiretsu (a group of companies centered around a 
bank) to further increase equity. 




Note: New Loan Amount calculated by subtracting previous loan outstanding from current loan outstanding 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: The statistics Bureau 
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Figure 2.8: Japan Nominal GDP and GDP Growth Rates 
VIM I 
Source: ESRI—Economic and Social Research Institute 
During this period of new banking reform, Japan ' s nominal G D P saw significant 
growth, with a gross increase of 9 5 % from 1980 to 1993 (see Figure 2.8). Consumption 
of fixed capital increased 150% and on average was 1 5 % of total GDP. As the market 
continued to grow rapidly, the Bank of Japan grew concerned and raised interest rates to 
6% in 1990 from 2 . 5 % in 1987 (Ito, 2010). The rising interest rates coincided with 
falling real estate and asset prices as banks reduced lending and asset collateral value, 
exacerbating the bubble collapse. 
During the peak of the Japanese and Ireland bubbles, price to income ratios were 
approximately 2 5 % and 5 5 % above normal ratios, respectively (see Figure 2.9). That 
translates to a peak multiple of 18x for Japan (The Economist, 2010) and approximately 
lOx for Ireland 1 . For Ireland, this represented a 3 5 % overvaluation of property (OECD, 
2008). Prices in Tokyo increased 2 0 0 % from 1985 to 1988—an average growth rate of 
4 4 . 2 5 % (see Figure 2.6). Japan ' s land was estimated to be worth 2,000 trillion yen, four 
t imes the amount of all of the United State—land that is twenty-five t imes larger than 
Japan (Wood, 1992). Japan ' s property prices started to deflate in the early 1990s. From 
'As estimated from graph taken from comparebuy2rent.ie citing sources from DoEHLG, PTSB-ESRI, Central 
Statistics Office (CSO), Halifax (Lloyds-TSB Group) 
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1991 to 1995, average Tokyo property prices had decreased by 52 .05% (see Figure 2.6). 
The deflation continued for over a decade as prices reaching historical lows in 2003. 
Figure 2.9: Ireland Price to Income Ratio 
Source: OECD; 100 = long term average 
Note: The peak of Japan's bubble is considered to be in 1989-1990 where the price to income ratio was 25% above 
average. Japan is only 15% above average in this figure because by 1991, prices had already started to deflate 
significantly, lowering this percentage in Japan. 
The recovery has been slow as Japan ' s population growth has been stagnant 
since the bubble collapse (see Figure 2.10). The data suggests a similar population trend 
in Ireland, as Figure 2.11 indicates minimal / flat growth since the bubble collapse in 
2007 and 2008. The population in both countries experienced higher-than-average 
growth during the period in which the bubbles formed. 
Japan ' s property prices had increased rapidly over the course of three years. 
Ireland's real estate prices had increased more gradually. Japan ' s government 
intervention and overall culture has been credited with the collapse of its economy, 
whereas the severity of Ireland's housing collapse can be partially attributed to the 
financial crisis that had affected several other countries from 2006 to 2009. The asset 
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bubbles of Ireland and Japan were initiated by similar factors identified as: Rapid 
economic growth, investment and construction growth, access to capital, income 
disparity, and population. Japan has yet to fully recover two decades after the collapse. 
Ireland's recovery t ime is still largely unknown. 

















Growth from 1992 to 2009: 2.46% 
Year 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: The Statistics Bureau 
















2.4 H I S T O R I C A L E X A M P L E # 3 : H O N G K O N G 
Ireland and Japan are widely considered to have been real estate and asset 
bubbles. This next section will consider an example in which property has continued to 
increase in price, but has not seen a decrease or "col lapse" that has significantly affected 
the country 's economy. This data will be used as evidence to show that China is 
experiencing real, permanent, economic growth. 
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Source: Ratings and Valuations Department: The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Hong Kong has experienced significant economic growth that was initiated by 
the industrial expansion of the country post World War II. The country differs from 
neighboring countries in that it has low tax, low government intervention, and free trade. 
The government has implemented several programs aimed at public housing and land 
reclamation, including an extensive public housing system aimed at lowering the cost of 
living for labor workers. The government does not actively regulate international trade, 
in which there are no significant barriers to the inflows and outflows of capital. Hong 
Kong ' s consistent growth from the mid-sixties to late-nineties has been widely 
accredited to the government ' s noninterventionalist policy. 
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Hong Kong was significantly impacted by the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 
(same time Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule), causing property prices to crash 4 5 % 
in 1998 (see Figure 2.12). The country has since recovered as housing prices 
experienced a 6 1 % increase from 2000 to 2009. G D P also grew at an annual rate of 3 % 
from 2000 to 2009 (see Figure 2.13). 
Figure 2.13: Hong Kong GDP Growth 
1,800,000 
Year 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department 
Hong Kong ' s rise in property prices has been a subject of debate as to whether or 
not it is a bubble. However, when being compared to Japan and Ireland, Hong Kong had 
not increased the amount of lending during the period between 2000 and 2007 when real 
estate prices were appreciating greatly. The government had decreased the amount of 
land for new private housing purposes, which caused an increase in prices due to the 
limited supply (see Figure 2.14). This is opposed to other countries, such as Ireland 
where land was continually being developed. From 2007 to 2009, Hong Kong lending 
increased as interest rates fell. This was during a period when many lending institutions 
across the world were frozen (see Figure 2.15, Figure 2.16). Hong K o n g ' s government 
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control on land permissions has contributed positively in lessening the impact of the 
global economic downturn. The country had not experienced a significant contraction in 
real estate prices from 2007 to 2009 when real estate markets were considered to be 
extremely vulnerable. This is an indication that the property market in Hong Kong is not 
currently exhibiting signs of a bubble, though prices have continued to increase. 
Figure 2.14: Hong Kong Number of housing domestic construction completions 
35000 
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,o 






2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Year 
Source: Ratings and Valuations Department: The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Figure 2.15: Hong Kong Total lending and 
percentage of GDP 
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Hong Kong and China mirror several economic patterns due to their proximity. 
This includes real estate trends as both countries have had high growth in property value 
in recent years. Unlike China, Hong Kong is not experiencing a significant population 
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shift into the labor force. Also, China has higher unemployment and stricter government 
regulations on banks and lending, which will be analyzed in the following section. 
3. CHINA A N A L Y S I S : IS T H E R E A B U B B L E ? 
This section presents statistical evidence and analysis for the argument of 
whether or not a real estate bubble exists in China. This section will use the evidence 
presented in the previous section regarding the five factors presented through the past 
bubbles in Japan and Ireland. 
The analyses from the previous Japan and Ireland examples imply that the 
signals of an asset bubble include the following: (1) Rapid G D P growth coupled with 
investor "hype" is caused by overly optimistic outlooks. This optimism triggers 
increased amounts of fixed asset purchasing and this signals to the market that there is 
(2) more demand leading to increased growth in construction. This is exacerbated with a 
(3) rise in lending from banks in conjunction with direct government intervention 
regarding interest rates and lending. Simultaneously, there are increasing (4) housing 
and income disparities, (i.e. people cannot afford the homes they buy and 
overvaluation), and (5) population growth that further drives demand and prices. For this 
section, these elements are applied to China on the basis of whether a bubble is present. 
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3.1 A B U B B L E E X I S T S 
1. Economic Growth and Optimism 
China is a rapidly growing country, now the second largest economy in the 
world. G D P has been growing at an average rate of 9 .7% for the past 30 years. It is 
projected that China will overtake the United States in G D P by the early 2020s (see 
Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: When will the BRICs grow larger than large developed countries of the world? 
France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
Brazil 2031 2036 2024 Beyond 2050 2036 Beyond 2050 
China Passed 2003 Passed 2007 Passed 2001 Passed 2010 Passed 2005 2020 
India 2019 2023 2016 2032 2022 Beyond 2050 
Russia 2023 2028 2018 Beyond 2050 2028 Beyond 2050 
Source: "The Transformation of China from an Emerging Economy to a Global Powerhouse" from China's 
Emerging Financial Markets: Challenges and Opportunities 
China ' s growth reflects the positive investor sentiment of its continued economic 
growth, evident in Section 1, as direct foreign investment has doubled within the past 
decade. The Shanghai Composi te Index has grown rap id ly—288% from year 2000 to 
2007 (see Figure 3.1). The growth in China ' s stock market has contributed in signaling 
the optimism investors have had in the Chinese economy. This can be further 
represented by the price to earnings (P/E) ratio. The P/E ratio, the price-per-share of a 
company divided by its earnings-per-share, is interpreted as what an investor is willing 
to pay for a company ' s earnings. A large ratio indicates investors ' confidence in the 
company ' s future earnings potential, although a large P/E ratio can also signify 
overvaluation. 
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There is evidence that suggests that the anticipation of rapid growth (represented 
by the P/E ratio) is not always sustainable. The recent Dot Com bubble had analyst 
projections of t remendous growth with high valuations and soaring investor confidence. 
The N A S D A Q Index doubled from 1999 to 2000 and the S&P500 tripled from 1995 to 
2000, as dozens of internet start-up firms became publicly traded companies. The 
positive sentiments caused these companies to become overvalued, and when the market 
corrected itself, the bubble collapsed causing N A S D A Q Index and S&P500 index to 
crash. This is also similar to Japan, as investor confidence had increased the Japanese 
stock market to eventually represent 4 2 % of total world capitalization and 1 5 1 % of 
Japan ' s total GDP. The Nikkei index lost 4 8 % when it crashed in 1990 and land values 
were reduced up to 50 % by 1991 (Wood, 1992). 
In 2007, the average P/E ratio for companies in the Shanghai Composi te Index 
was above 50x (i.e. investors were willing to pay fifty t imes earnings) (see Figure 3.2). 
For comparison, during the peak of the Dot Com bubble the P/E ratio was 45x for the 
S&P 500 Composi te Index (see Figure 3.3). 




Source: Yahoo! Finance 
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Figure 3.2: Shanghai Composite Index historical 
P/E Ratio 1997-2007 
Figure: 3.3: S&P Composite Stock P/E Ratio 
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Source: Bespoke Investment Group 
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Source: Robert J. Shiller Irrational Exuberance 
2. Investment and Construction Growth 
Figure 3.4: China fixed asset share of GDP 
1980 1984 1 1996 2000 2004 ZOOS 
Source: Andrew Hunt Economics from "China's Red Flags " 
From 2008 to 2009, China has increased investment in fixed assets by 30%, and 
has increased it by 2 5 % from 2009 to 2010 (chinadataonline.org). For the decade, 
investment has increased more than five-fold. The percentage fixed assets over GD P 
has increased more than 3 0 % from year 2000 to year 2008 (Figure 3.4). This suggests 
that the fixed assets are not being utilized efficiently. When fixed assets are bought, 
GDP increases. GDP has not been increasing by the same rate as fixed asset investment, 
indicating that properties are not being sold. ". . .Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman 
suggested that the growth of the Asian Tiger economies had come to depend on ever-
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increasing investment inputs. Such investment, however, was subject to diminishing 
returns. This analysis is equally valid for China, where the efficiency of investment (as 
measured by incremental GDP growth for every unit of investment) has been on a 
downward trend" (Chancellor, 2010). From 2009 to 2010, the most significant increases 
in investment include: real estate (36.4%), construction (23.1%), and manufacturing 
(26.1%). It is estimated by C B Richard Ellis Group Inc. that Beijing has an office 
vacancy rate of 22.4%. This estimate may be as high as 50%, but figures are not 
officially tracked by the Chinese government. 
An alternative v iew is that high levels of investment reflect anticipated increases 
in future demand. Since the year 2000, it has been estimated that the Chinese are moving 
into urban cities at a pace of 15 to 20 million per year (Childs, Keene). A recent 
McKinsey&Company report estimates that an additional 350 million Chinese will be 
urbanized by 2025, bringing the total urban to 1 billion. Current construction and 
purchasing trends in China appear to be following this prediction as construction 
continues to increase significantly year-over-year (Figure 3.5). Figure 3.5 indicates that 
construction had been growing in tandem with purchasing and completions from 1987 to 
2000. The "Completed Construction" line moves closer to the "Commercial Sold" and 
"Residential Sold" bars suggesting that demand is outpacing supply. From 2005 to 2009 
the "Completed Construction" line overlaps the "Sold" bars such that demand has now 
outstripped supply. This has prompted a t remendous acceleration in construction. From 
2000 to 2004, projects under construction increased 1 1 3 % and increased an additional 
128%) from 2004 to 2009, for a total of 3 8 6 % increase since 2000. It is unclear as to how 
much of this percentage increase from 2000 to 2008 is attributable to the 2008 Beijing 
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Olympics though the growth of construction is still upward trending for the years 
following the Olympics. 




It is highly debatable whether this trending construction growth is necessary for 
future demand. Because construction is based off of future forecasts, it is possible to 
oversupply and cause an asset price crash if demand forecasts are wrong, as was 
Ireland's case. 
3. Access to Capital 
It is evident that the accessibility of credit is a primary driver of asset prices, as 
analyzed in the previous sections. China has increased the amount of lending in the past 
several years through low interest rates (see Figure 3.6). Its banks have lent 6.3 trillion 
yuan (965 billion USD) in 2009 and 7.95 trillion (1.21 trillion USD) in 2010. Shanghai ' s 
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Bank of Communicat ions estimates that China will lend 7 to 7.5 trillion yuan in 2011 . 
From 2008 to 2009, China ' s financial institutions have increased their loans outstanding 
by 3 2 % and by 2 0 % from 2009 to 2010 (chinadata.org). The increase in loans 
outstanding year-over-year has only been 19% on average from 1985 to 2007. 
Approximately 2 5 % of the new loans issued in 2010 were towards real estate (The 
Associated Press, 2011). 
Figure 3.6: China benchmark interest rate 
CHINA INTEREST RATE 
B*K*wwifk wtmmt 
Jan/02 Jan/04 Jan/06 
Source: tradingeconomics.com, The People's Bank of China 
Jan/08 Jan/10 
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4. Increasing Asset Prices and Income Disparity 
As previously established, China ' s real estate prices have been increasing rapidly 
(see section 1). Rising prices themselves are not of concern as long as they remain in 
line with income. Real estate prices have appreciated considerably but income has not 
by the same measure (see Figure 3.8), indicating that the Chinese cannot afford the 
properties they are purchasing and that the property is overvalued. The disparity 
between real estate prices and income has been growing steadily. For the historical 
bubbles previously observed (Ireland and Japan), this has been a commonali ty. Figure 
3.8 indicates that China ' s largest provinces have already far exceeded Ireland's ratio and 
the national average is approaching that level. 
Figure 3.8: Property Value to Annual Disposable Income Ratios 
•16,-1 
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Source: CEIC, Morgan Stanley, GMO Calculations, economistonline.org, from Business Insider 
As this ratio continues to increase, Chinese citizens become more vulnerable in a 
housing downturn as it will be more difficult to pay back lenders. As a result, the lenders 
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and those that depend upon the financial system are more heavily exposed to large 
losses. 
McKinsey&Company reports that by 2025 China will have an additional 6 new 
"megacit ies"—cities with more than 10 million in population. From 1990 and 2003 , 103 
mill ion have migrated from rural areas, and as McKinsey predicts, migration will 
account for 7 0 % of the urban movement from 2005 until 2025. The other 3 0 % will be 
due to rural areas becoming urban cities (Woetzel, Et AL, 2009). This projection 
provides the justification for the continual price increases and the rational for 
construction companies to continue to build. 
5. Shifts in Population, Rural-to-Urban 
Optimistic projections, even from reputable companies such as McKinsey should 
be followed with caution. McKinsey ' s report was published in March of 2009, making 
2007 the most recent published population data for China at that t ime. China ' s urban 
population grew by 2 .90% in 2007, up from 2 .66% in 2006. McKinsey ' s projection of 1 
billion urban citizens in 2025 represents an annual growth rate of approximately 3.0%, 
which is a reasonable growth rate given the growth rates in 2006 and 2007. However, in 
2008 and 2009 the urban population grew only by 2 .17% and 2 .50% respectively. The 
urban population had continued to increase though this rate has decelerated. On average, 
the rate of urbanization has been decreasing by 6.584% per year since 1996 (see Figure 
3.9). In applying this decrease in the annual growth rate, since 2007 the number of 
projected urban citizens may actually only be 815 million instead of 1 billion by 2025 
(see Figure 3.10). As presented with the Ireland analysis, construction can take several 
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years and the adjustment to actual demand is slow. If demand projections are wrong, 
excess supply is possible and an asset price crash can occur. 
These factors in comparison to past bubbles appear to indicate an asset bubble 
forming in China. However , it can be argued that China ' s growth is real and sustainable, 
with its asset market not in danger of overheating and collapse. This next section we will 
apply these five factors and analyze them from the perspective that China ' s growth is 
not indicative of a bubble. 
Figure 3.9: Growth of the Rate of Urbanization in China 
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3.2 A B U B B L E D O E S N O T E X I S T 
1. Economic Growth and Optimism 
China is one of the fastest growing developing countries and it is estimated to 
surpass the U.S. as the largest economy in the near future. China ' s growth is concerning 
as investors ' heightened optimism toward the country 's prospects may become irrational 
and drive asset prices far beyond the fundamental value. However, the argument can be 
made in recognizing that this optimism is rational given China ' s growth projections and 
also considering that the definition of fundamental value varies from person-to-person 
making it difficult to identify the true value in the real estate market. 
McKinsey&Company ' s report on China states that an additional 350 million 
Chinese will be urbanized by 2020, quadrupling its GDP. This is a strong indication that 
the investment growth in real estate will continue to rise to accommodate for the 
migration and real estate prices will also increase as urban areas become denser with less 
space available. 
From the analysis in the previous section, it was shown that the P/E ratios of 
countries during an asset bubble are similar to the P/E ratio of China ' s Shanghai 
Composi te Index. This section compares China to Hong Kong, a country that has been 
growing rapidly for the past several decades without exhibiting signs of a bubble. Figure 
3.11 represents the growth of the Hang Seng Index, a Hong Kong index listing over 40 
companies. 
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Figure 3.11: Hang Seng Index growth percentage since 1986 
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Source: Yahoo! Finance 
The growth in Hong K o n g ' s main index is considerable, though it has had some 
declines (e.g. Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the global recession of 2008). Overall, 
the country has been able to recuperate quickly through these crises, indication of a 
strong economy being temporarily effected by global trends and regular cyclical cycles. 
A similar situation can be applied to China, as it quickly recovered from the effects of a 
global downturn in 2008 (see Figure 3.2). 
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The P/E ratio for the HSI has been relatively steady compared to China ' s 
Shanghai Index. Since 1986, HSI ' s P/E ratio has been averaging a 15.12x multiple (see 
Figure 3.12). The Shanghai Index ' s P/E ratio has been steady around 22x for the past 
two years 3 , recently receding from levels of 50x+ in 2007 (see Figure 3.13). The decline 
in the index ' s P/E ratio may suggest that China has begun to decrease its rate of growth 
to a steadier, sustained, and predictable pace similar to Hong Kong. This is opposed to 
the rapid, unpredictable growth that makes economies more susceptible to bubbles. 
Figure 3.13: Shanghai P/E Ratio 
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2. Investment and Construction Growth 
It has been established that China ' s construction of commercial and residential 
real estate has grown exponentially. This increase in real estate investment could be 
warranted in order to satisfy the upcoming demand for housing in urbanized provinces. 
2Author's calculations based off of data from hangseng.com 
3From figure 3.11, the latest P/E ratio is 20.95x, this is dated in 2008. Most recent P/E ratio (March 2011) is averaging 
23.3lx; source: sse.com 
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This is evidenced by the McKinsey&Company report, estimating that 40 billion 
additional square meters of floor space will be built by 2025 in five million new 
buildings. Of these five million, they estimate that 50,000 could be skyscrapers. In 2010, 
China completed construction on buildings with a total estimated floor space of 759.6 
million square meters (chinadataonline.org). To achieve 40 billion square meters by 
2025, completed floor space will have to grow at an annual rate of 15.08% per year from 
2010 to 2025 (see Figure 3.14). If urbanization and migration estimates are correct, this 
increase in investment will be necessary to order satisfy demand. 
Figure 3.14: Projected China increase in fixed asset investment 
Year 
Source: McKinsey&Company, chinadataonline.org, author calculation and estimates 
Referring back to the definition of a bubble—when asset prices are not derived 
from supply and demand functions—the data presented from years 2005 to 2009 
indicates that real estate has been in high demand. Figure 3.6 from the previous section 
shows that demand has outstripped the amount supplied (completed construction) for 
those years. Figure 3.15 shows the cumulative amount of square meters that are "back 
log" or inventory that is unoccupied or unsold after the completion of construction (i.e. 
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buildup of unsold properties since 1986). 
The calculation is made taking the previous year ' s "unsold" square footage, 
adding it the amount of completed square footage and then subtracting the amount sold 
within that year. The graph illustrates that there is continual, steady growth in this 
property buildup, averaging a 14% growth rate per year from 1987 to 2004. From 2005 
to 2009 the unsold buildup has decreased at an average rate of 6% per year, signaling 
that demand is outpacing supply (completed construction). After 2005 the buildup has 
started to decline as demand continues to be strong. The increasing pace in construction 
still far outweighs the slower increases in demand, furthering the debate of China ' s asset 
bubble as prices continue to rise. 




Source: chinaonlinedata. org, author's calculations 
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3. Access to Capital 
China ' s government is aware of the growing amount of real estate being 
developed, the properties that are being unsold, and the possibility of oversupply leading 
to a price collapse. Though the amount of unsold and unoccupied properties has been in 
steady decline since 2005, the government has taken several precautionary steps to avoid 
an asset collapse. Since October of 2010, the government has raised the benchmark 
lending rate three t imes, with the latest in February of 2011 . The current one-year rate 
stands at 6 .06% (Wang, 2011). In September 2010 new regulations were implemented 
requiring first-time buyers of homes over 90 square meters to have a 3 0 % down 
payment and second home buyers to have a 5 0 % down payment (Zhang, 2010). In 
November 2010 the government instructed banks to halt all loans to real estate 
developers until 2011(77**? Star Online, 2010). In January 2011 the government again 
increased the min imum down payment of second homes to 6 0 % and has allowed banks 
to suspend or postpone loans to third-home purchasers (Zhao, Li, Dingmin, Cao, 2011). 
The real estate lending quota has also been reduced by 20 % for 2011 (The Associated 
Press, 2010). 
By increasing interest rates and down payments and reducing capital available 
for lending, speculative buyers are less inclined to purchase properties for the purpose of 
re-selling them later at higher prices. Speculative purchasing is one of the factors most 
contributing to asset bubbles as this can inflate actual demand and cause unnecessary 
construction. Reducing the amount of lending available may decrease the development 
of real estate, allowing true demand to consume China ' s existing, unsold supply. 
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4. Income Disparity 
The property value-to-income ratio is considered to be high in China as many 
Chinese citizens have voiced frustration over the affordability of housing. The Chinese 
government has expressed that its priority is to limit speculative buying through 
increased rates though this in turn makes affordability weaker. Properties are still being 
purchased as the value-to-income ratio and interest rate remain high. This is due to the 
high down payments and the high savings that the Chinese possess (see Figure 3.16). 
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These high down payments offset the value-to-income ratio disparity as the ratio 
does not include preexisting capital. Therefore, the Chinese are unlike the Irish or the 
Japanese regarding home affordability, as the majority of the property will not be 
purchased on credit. This shields financial institutions from major losses from an asset 
value collapse. 
Figure 3.17 illustrates China ' s affordability by dividing total wages by the 
average price of square meters occupied per capita. 
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Source: chinadataonline.org, author's calculations 
The above chart was calculated by the following steps: 
(1) First, "price per square meter sold" is calculated by dividing "total annual square 
footage of residential property sold" by "total sale value of residential property". 
Both data sets are found at chinadataonline.org 
(2) Next , "average price per capita" is calculated. This calculation represents what 
the average citizen must pay for their living space. This is calculated by 
multiplying "price per square meter sold" and "per capital living space". Per 
capita living space is average amount of square meters the average person 
occupies. This data is found on chinadataonline.org. 
(3) Finally, annual average "Wages" (found on chinadataonline.org) is divided by 
"average price per capita" to assess the affordability. 
34 
If the ratio is increasing, this indicates that incomes are rising faster that the price 
of the average space of living (average space of living is the numerator). If the ratio is 
decreasing, the cost or the average space of living is increasing faster, making the 
affordability of housing weaker in these provinces. Figure 3.17 indicates that 
affordability is decreasing rapidly from 1994 to 2006 in the Chongqing and Tianjin 
provinces, whereas for provinces Guangdong, Liaoning, and Hubei , it looks to be 
increasing. This figure does not immediately appear to illustrate an affordability problem 
in China because each province has a different trend in affordability. When averaging 
the ratio for all five of these provinces (included is Beijing and Shanghai) in Figure 3.18, 
the data suggests that affordability has been increasing from 1994 to 2001 , decreasing 
rapidly from 2002 to 2005, and increasing again from 2007 to present (note: the increase 
in affordability from 2007 to present is represented only by Beijing as data for the other 
provinces was not available in this data set after 2006). 
Figure 3.19, taken from a scholarly paper from International Monetary Fund, 
indicates a similar trend (though this figure assess all provinces). The figure implies that 
the affordability issue in China is not as severe or as volatile as other countries. China ' s 
ratio of house price to income is far be low the level of other countries during the period 
in which those countries ' real estate bubbles collapsed. The housing price to disposable 
income figure discussed in the previous section (see Figure 3.8) indicates that Shanghai 
and Beijing are becoming unaffordable; however when combining all of China ' s 
provinces, the ratio is not indicative of a housing bubble. 
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Figure 3.18: Combined Average Affordability of Five Largest Provinces 
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5. Shifts in Population, Rural-to-Urban 
Since 1980, China ' s rural population has decreased 10% whereas the urban 
population has increased 2 2 5 % 4 . Citizens are migrating to bigger cities and rural areas 
Author calculations from chinadataonline.org 
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are becoming major cities through modernization. Though the urban population is 
growing rapidly, it is unclear as to whether this can be attributed to a bubble. A higher 
population means higher demand and higher demand leads to increasing prices. These 
increases in asset prices will be intrinsically linked to this growing demand and not to 
speculative, bubble-driven, factors. 
Figure 3.22 indicates that the total value of property sold per capita is much 
lower in areas where the population is experiencing stagnant or declining growth. Hubei, 
Hunan, and Sichuan are all considered to be rural provinces (see Figure 3.20), whereas 
Beijing and Shanghai are considered to be the fastest growing urban provinces (see 
Figure 3.21). Figure 3.22 implies that China ' s population and property prices are closely 
correlated and it can be concluded that the surging prices in the urban areas are a 
function of supply and demand. 
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Figure 3.22: China Total Value of Property Sold per Capita (Yuan/Person) 
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4. CONCLUSION: A B U B B L E O R N O T ? 
As the analysis has shown, there currently appears to be several factors in favor 
and against the existence of a real estate bubble in China. These factors can be applied to 
previous bubbles, such as the one in Japan during the 1980s and the more recent bubble 
in Ireland. Factors such as growth in domestic and foreign investment, property 
construction, access to lending, income disparities, and demand driven by population are 
important in determining the presence of a bubble. This section will draw a conclusion 
based on the evidence presented in the previous sections. 
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1. Growth and Optimism: In the affirmative analysis, it can be conclude that China 
is growing rapidly and has attracted increasing amounts of foreign investment. Its 
growth and optimism has also been well represented in the Shanghai Composi te 
Index with P/E ratios above 50x in 2007, possibly indicating overvaluation. The 
ratios and the index have descended considerably in 2008. The refutation analysis 
shows China ' s growth is more similar to Hong Kong, a country that has been 
experiencing property growth for an extended period while not exhibiting other signs 
of a bubble. China ' s growth can also be the result of a population shift that is 
generating more demand, causing real estate prices to rise. As a result, this factor is 
not a significant contributing factor in concluding that China ' s real estate bubble 
exists. 
2. Investment and Construction Growth: China has been exponentially increasing 
the amount of money invested in fixed assets. China ' s continual real estate 
development would be concerning if real demand did not exist. From the 
McKinsey&Company report we can ascertain that supply will be met with 
considerable demand as the Chinese migrate to cities and continue to modernize 
existing rural towns. However, if estimates are not correct, or if there should be an 
unexpected catastrophe halting this expansion, there will be a t remendous 
oversupply of property. The uncertainty of estimates has led to the conclusion that 
this factor is disputable as to whether or not it favors the presence of a real estate 
bubble. 
Both the affirmation and refutation analysis have shown that demand and 
construction have grown in the past several years, though construction has grown 
39 
several t imes more than this demand. This has left a considerable cumulative buildup 
of unsold properties since 1986. The data suggests that this buildup will continue to 
grow as new projects under construction continue to increase. This excess supply is 
possibly indicating the presence of a bubble. 
3. Easy Money: For both affirmation and refutation, it is evident that the 
government is acutely aware of the ongoing rise of property prices and construction. 
They have taken several precautionary steps to limit property speculation, including 
increases in the lending interest rate, adding additional requirements to buy a 
property, and allowing more stringent terms in lending to developers. The 
government ' s continual monitoring of the asset market signifies their commitment in 
preventing an asset bubble collapse. 
4. Income disparity: The affirmation analysis shows that property values in China 
far exceed the income of the average person. Generally, high price-to-income ratios 
signal overvaluation, making the economy more vulnerable to a severe real estate 
collapse. Though the ratio is high for China, the saving rate for its citizens is also 
very high. Unlike past bubbles where residents had bought on credit, Chinese 
citizens will pay for the majority of their property in cash. This makes the property 
value to income ratio less reliable in determining the Chinese affordability of 
housing. In addition, the data suggests that China ' s affordability when measuring 
residential income to price is not approaching the level of other countries that have 
experienced a bubble collapse. Therefore, the income disparity factor does not 
indicate a bubble. 
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5. Shifts in Population, Rural-to-Urban: The examples of Japan and Ireland indicate 
that populations grow when a bubble forms and become stagnant or decline when a 
bubble collapses. China is experiencing continuing population growth in its urban 
areas. If a real estate bubble were present, the appreciation of property prices would 
be across all provinces. However, the high population growth provinces are the areas 
that have had the most significant price appreciation. This is a function of supply and 
demand as the urban migration has increased the demand in those areas. In rural 
areas where population is declining, we can see only slight increases in property 
prices per capita (see Figure 3.22). Because present demand and anticipated demand 
are directly linked to the value of the property, this is not a factor exhibiting the 
signs of a bubble. 
After thorough examination of previous bubbles and in-depth analysis of the five 
pertinent elements of a bubble, it is my conclusion that at the present t ime of this 
writing, a real estate bubble does not exist in China. Although real estate prices are high 
by several measures, the analysis suggests the valuations reflect the fundamentals of 
supply and demand. The government ' s early detection of overheating and their 
subsequent actions to tighten credit and the increased demand stemming from China ' s 
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